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I. PROLOGUE

As we sat outside the courtroom waiting for the bidding procedures
hearing to commence before yet another § 363 sale, getting ready to do
battle over breakup fees and to deal with the Unsecured Creditors
Committee over what avoidance claims would fund the liquidating trust,
my son Craig, a member of our firm turned to me and asked "gee Dad,
they call Chapter IIthe reorganization provision of the [Bankruptcy] Code
but it doesn't seem like there is ever a case anymore that I would look at
as a true reorganization. Has it always been that way?" "No son," I replied,
"I can remember a time, long, long ago, before white knights came riding
in on their stalking horses when insolvency lawyers and their debtor
clients had to actually negotiate creatively with creditors who actually
expected a reasonable dividend to be paid on their claims, and there was
a bargaining process to determine what it would take to satisfy creditors
while allowing a troubled company to rehabilitate itself and continue in
business without sacrificing its going concern value and hence equity. Ah,
those were the days."
"Well," Craig asked, snapping me back to reality, "what happened?"
It seems like every case now is a form of liquidation either occurring
through a § 363 sale or some other device, and while someone may end up
with the assets of a business as a going concern, it is the debtor and the
unsecured creditors who are left to pick up the pieces through some sort
of liquidating trust.
So it was that father and son decided to investigate this issue and
determine whatever happened to the seemingly lost art of Chapter 11
reorganization. Has it truly been "lost," and if so is that necessarily a good
or bad thing?
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II. THE PREMISE

To attempt to answer this question, we must first establish as a premise
what exactly constitutes a Chapter 11 reorganization. The provisions of
Chapter 11 certainly provide a framework for what we call a
reorganization but just as certainly do not require it.' Liquidation of assets
is perfectly permissible through a Chapter 11 plan.2 Generally
reorganization can be defined as a proceeding that results in a restructuring
and payment of debt that leaves a business intact in some form as a going
concern. 3 It may or may not result in a change of ownership and control.
As it has been aptly put, a Chapter 11 reorganization involves "a
'hypothetical sale' of the debtor's assets... [wherein] existing [creditors]
exchange... claims or interests for... new claims against the reorganized
debtor."4 A liquidation on the other hand results, whether in a Chapter 11
or Chapter 7, in an actual sale of assets with proceeds used to pay
creditors' claims as far as they go in the order of priority established by the
Code.
Either of these processes may be driven by market conditions or the
courts or may be the result of a combination of both.5 Market conditions
and the economy generally have, and will always have, an impact on
decisions made by debtors and creditors as to whether reorganization or
liquidation will be more beneficial to either or both.6 As insolvency laws
became more structured, proceedings and decisions originally controlled
1. "[F]lexibility and equity [were] built into Chapter 11" to address the "multiple [and]
competing considerations" of a reorganization. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513,
525 (1984).
2.
While we typically think of Chapter 11 as the "reorganization" section of the
Bankruptcy Code (as opposed to Chapter 7, the "liquidation" section), it is not
uncommon for debtors to use the Chapter 11 process to liquidate. This is because
Chapter II provides more flexibility and control in determining how to go about
selling off the various aspects of the debtor's business and distributing the
proceeds. A typical mechanism for effecting a Chapter 11 liquidation is the
creation of a "liquidating trust"-state-law trust managed by a group of creditors
that succeeds to the debtor's assets and administers the liquidation and distribution
process.
In re Insilco Techs., Inc., 480 F.3d 212, 214 n.l (3d Cir. 2007).
3. See generally Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of
CorporateBankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 85 (1995).
4. Id. at 94.
5. See Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 3, at 91.
6. See id.at 93.
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by the courts were replaced in large part by decisions which are made
primarily by a debtor in conjunction with creditor groups. However, courts
still maintain an impact on the process. That impact has, over time, shifted
from actual decision making to resolution of disputes pertaining to these
decisions.7
This analysis is not a new concept. Advocates of what one author has
referred to as the "rehabilitationist" view refer back to the old days "in
which financially distressed companies . . . were [primarily]
rehabilitated." This typically carried with it some "sort of change in
ownership." 9 Advocates of a return to this era express concern with the
increased use and significance of§ 363 sales and claim that such processes
depress the availability of traditional reorganization. " A contrary view has
been expressed by a group referred to as "efficientists" who opine that the
era of what we have referred to as "traditional" reorganizations may in fact
be "drawing to a close" as a result of "larger economic forces [which] have
caused 'going concern' value to be less common [and] which in turn
make[] preserving the historic debtor entity less viable [and] render[s] [the
current model of] [C]hapter 11 obsolete."'"
It is the position of this Article that the truth must lie somewhere in
between. However, in order to determine how we have gotten where we
are today, we must examine where we have come from and how that
process has evolved.
III. BACK IN THE DAY
We must first look back at the predecessors of the current Bankruptcy
Code which were individual congressional legislative Acts during the
Eighteenth Century culminating in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
Act), 2 as amended by the Chandler Act of 1938 (Chandler
(Bankruptcy
3
Act).'

7. Note specifically the removal of the courts from various aspects of the process under the
Code as opposed to the Act (see text accompanying infra note 13), i.e., the disinvolvement of the
courts in the administrative aspect of cases and the creation of the U.S. Trustee system itself.
8. See James H.M. Sprayregen et al., Chapter 11: Not Perfect But Better Than the
Alternative, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 60 (2005).
9. See id
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Bankruptcy Act, ch. I, 30 Stat. 544, 544-66 (1898) (amended 1938).
13. Chandler Act, ch. 1,52 Stat. 840, 840 (1938) (amended 1978). The combined law ofU.S.
Bankruptcy from 1898-1978 as encompassed by the Bankruptcy Act and the Chandler Act is
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The economic underpinnings of a business reorganization derive from
the notion that creditors will achieve a greater percentage recovery of the
debt that is owed to them where a business continues as a going concern. 4
It is assumed that the debtor can repay a larger portion of its debts from
future earning power or the sale of the business as a going concern. 5 Thus,
the debtor will realize a larger profit if given time to restructure the
debtor's business model or to find a buyer who is willing to pay the true
value of the business and its assets instead of the reduced payout from the
conditions of a firehouse sale.16
In early American History, most bankruptcy legislation was a
temporary fix-usually in response to a national economic "panic"-- what
today might be called a recession or depression.' 7 In the late nineteenth
century, equity receiverships developed to confront the problem of
distressed railroads. 8 These equity receiverships were very similar to an
assignment for the benefit of creditors under modem state law 9 or a
"liquidating" 2 ° Chapter 1 21 The receiver would take possession of the
entity and run the business while selling off the assets for the benefit of
creditors.22 This began the transition from a completely managercontrolled process to a creditor-driven proceeding, which became even
more pronounced under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.23

collectively described herein as the "Act."
14. See Ali M.M. Mojdehi & Janet Dean Gertz, The Implicit "Good Faith"Requirement in
Chapter11 Liquidations:A Rule in Searchof a Rationale, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 143, 15152 (2006). "The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to
restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs,
pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization
is that assets are used for production in the industry for which they are designed are more valuable
than those same assets sold for scrap." Id. (quoting H. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977)).
15. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. Lasalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S.
434, 453 (1999) (referencing two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11 reorganizations:
preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors).
16. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS,
ch. 8 (4th ed. 2001).
17. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Law in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5, 13-21 (1995).
18. Id.at 21-22.
19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 727.101 (2007).
20. See In re Jartran, Inc., 886 F.2d 859, 868 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that liquidating plans
were permissible under Chapter 11).
21. Cf.Tabb,supra note 17, at 23.
22. Id.at 22.
An Evolutionary Theory of CorporateLaw and Corporate
23. See David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Bankruptcy, 51 VAND.L.REv. 1325, 1359 (1998); Bankruptcy Act,ch. 1,30 Stat. 544, 544-65
(1898) (amended 1938).
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The Bankruptcy Act remained in effect for more than eighty years
during both the harsh economic times of the Great Depression and the
booming growth following the second World War. Corporate
reorganization was first given real form in the 1930s in response to the
hazards of the Great Depression.24 Major changes to the Bankruptcy Act
came in 1938 under the Chandler Act,2" which classified reorganizations
under chapters that were based on the types of entities being reorganized:
Chapter X for large corporate re-organizations, 26 Chapter XI for small
business workouts involving unsecured debt,27 and Chapter XII for real
property reorganizations.2" Chapters X, XI, and XII and the judicial and
business practices that arose around and because of these business
reorganization models directly influenced and led to Congress's move to
enactment the modem Code under the 1978 amendments.29
A cursory review of the concepts encompassed by each is necessary to
understand the current state of business reorganization under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and its subsequent amendments and case
law interpretations that affect the modem bankruptcy practitioner on a
nearly daily basis in making decisions regarding reorganization and
liquidation.
IV. CHAPTER X

Chapter X exemplified a large and complex topic of corporate
reorganization and was designed primarily for large publicly traded
corporations.3 ° It applied to corporations subject to ordinary bankruptcy
plans of reorganization and affected all claims both secured and unsecured
as well as corporate stocks.3 Under Chapter X of the Act, it was
mandatory that a reorganization trustee be appointed to oversee the
business, at least for every debtor owing in excess of $250,000.32 Chapter
X reorganization involved corporate finance of a high complexity that was
not usual in ordinary bankruptcies under Chapter XI and Chapter XII.33

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Tabb, supra note 17, at 28.
Chandler Act, ch. 1,52 Stat. 840 (1938).
Id. ch. X, 52 Stat. 840, 883.
Id. ch. XI, 52 Stat. 840, 905.
Id. ch. XII, 52 Stat. 840, 916.
Tabb, supra note 17, at 30.
See Chandler Act, ch. X, §§ 126-133, 52 Stat. 840, 883, 885-90 (1938).
See generally id.
Id. ch. XII, § 156, 52 Stat. at 888.
JAMES ANGELL MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRuPrcY

24 (1956).
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Plans were required to receive preliminary approval by a court before
being submitted to security holders for acceptance.34 If the debt exceeded
$3 million, the plan was subject to the oversight of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) for examination and reporting, and every
plan required judicial scrutiny." A court could examine and disregard any
employment or contractual agreement and had the power to order
compensation to any parties in interest for services in connection with
either the administration of the estate or a plan approved by the judge. 6
V. CHAPTER XI
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act was introduced in 1938 as part of the
Chandler Act in the wake of the devastating economic upheavals of the
Great Depression. 31 It is a descendent of § 12 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act
which was later repealed. 8 Chapter XI was meant to deal with financial
problems that were encountered in a small business "plan of
arrangement ' 39 and intended to be undertaken by the private business
owner as compared with those of the primarily publicly-traded businesses
involved in Chapter X proceedings. Generally, a Chapter XI workout or
plan of arrangement was considered to be principally concerned with
small, local businesses and was a preferred option to the traditional
liquidating bankruptcy.' Whereas, Chapter X bankruptcies required a
greater deal of experience in securities and corporate law and a deeper
understanding of corporate finance;4 ' under Chapter XI, individual
partnerships and corporations including limited partnerships could seek
protection of bankruptcy.42 Chapter XI was also open to wage earners
although they were offered more protections and were encouraged to file
under Chapter XIII. 43 A consolidated association of corporations was
eligible for a voluntary Chapter XI" and a bankruptcy court could ignore
the structure of corporate entities and consolidate a number of corporations

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Chandler Act, ch. X, §§ 174-176, 52 Stat. 840, 890-91 (1938).
See id. ch. X, § 172, 52 Stat. 840, 890-91.
Id. ch. X, art. XIII, § 242, 52 Stat. 840, 900.
Id. ch. XI, 52 Stat. 840, 905; see also Tabb, supra note 17, at 28-29.
MACLACHLAN, supra note 33, at 24.
See Chandler Act, ch. XI, § 306, 52 Stat. 840, 906 (1938).
MACLACHLAN, supra note 33, at 24.
Seeid. at24.
DANIEL R. COwANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 902 (7th ed. 1998).
Id.

41.
42.
43.
44. id.
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into a single Chapter XI filing.45 The choice of remedies between Chapters
X, XI, and XII was governed partly by the following: statutory limitations
and case law, practices and attitudes of government agencies, past
relationships with creditors, and judicial attitudes of business and financial
considerations.46 Often times, larger corporations would seek loopholes to
avoid the cumbersome Chapter X filing for the benefits available in a
Chapter XI proceeding.47
Chapters X and XI were considered to be mutually exclusive remedies;
when one was appropriate, an attempt to maintain the opposite would be
grounds for a dismissal by a court.48 Chapter XI was appropriate to allow
an extension of time to pay debt to unsecured creditors or a scaling down
of the amount of debts.4 9 However, where major restructuring of the
corporation such as eliminating classes of equity holders or some large
unsecured creditor was needed, Chapter XI would not be adequate, and a
court would impose the requirement to proceed under Chapter X" °
Although this may seem to have been a fairly straightforward rule, actually
choosing between Chapter X and Chapter XI caused great consternation
to bankruptcy attorneys of the day. Under the 1898, Bankruptcy Act and
the Chandler Act modifications, the SEC could intervene whenever there
were public investors holding equity securities such as common or
preferred shares or debt securities such as bonds or debentures." It was
presumed that "unscrupulous" management would seek Chapter XI
protection to avoid the close examination of the elected trustee that
occurred in Chapter X because all of corporate management's misdeeds,
or even normal business practices that might be portrayed negatively, were
far more likely to come to light.52 Chapter X cases were filed voluntarily
by the professional management on occasion, and especially when the
management had confidence that the shareholders would be removed and
the professional management might be retained in the newly reorganized
entity. 3
Unlike the remedies of Chapters X and XI, Chapters XI and XII were
not mutually exclusive. 4 Only where there were no secured interests in
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. § 904.
COWANS, supra note 42, § 902.
Id. § 904.
See Chandler Act, ch. XI, art. VIII, § 357, 52 Stat. 840, 910 (1938).
COWANS, supra note 42, § 904.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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real property was Chapter XII considered inappropriate." On the other
hand, if the core function of the bankruptcy was to reorganize the secured
interests, a Chapter XI would not be considered appropriate by the
supervising court.56 In Chapter XII, there was no formal creditor
committee; however, there was often something similar to the modem
committee57 found in Chapter XI after the 1978 amendments." Like the
modem Code, Chapter XII allowed creditors to compose a plan;59
60
however, there was no such benefit to creditors under Chapter XI.
Generally, tax considerations favored Chapter XI or Chapter XII in that
forgiveness of debt was a non-taxable event under bankruptcy whereas
forgiveness of debts that arose in private workouts was both taxable and
heavily taxed.6 '
It was possible under the Act to convert Chapter XII into either Chapter
X or Chapter XI, but the debtor's consent was necessary.62 It was not
possible to have an involuntary Chapter XI; however, it was possible to
have an involuntary Chapter X.63 Chapter XI was generally appropriate
where a simple plan of arrangement with the creditors could suffice to
carry the debtor through troubled times; however, "[i]f 'surgery' on the
corporate structure affecting the rights of equity holders" was needed,
Chapter X was the appropriate choice. 4 To transfer Chapter XI into
Chapter X, the SEC or other interested party had to file a Motion for
Conversion within 120 days from the first day set for the first meeting of
creditors and this was of course a strategic weapon against the debtor.65 It
was possible to extend the 120 day limitation for conversion from Chapter
XI into Chapter X.
Under Chapter XI, the day-to-day running of the business could be
handled by either a debtor in possession (DIP), a receiver, or a trustee.66 In
Chapter XI, much like under § 363 of the modem Code, it was impossible
for the DIP to conclude a sale without court permission, but ironically such

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

COwANS, supra note 42, § 904.
Id.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102-1103 (2000).
COwANS, supra note 42, § 904.
Chandler Act ch. XII, art. IX, 52 Stat. 840, 922 (1938).
See generally id., ch. XI, 52 Stat. 840, 905-16 (1938).
COWANS, supra note 42, § 904.

62. BANKRUPTCY RULE OF PROCEDURE 11-17 (1976).

63. COWANS, supra note 42, § 901; Chandler Act, ch. III, § 4, 52 Stat. 840, 844-45 (1938).
64. See S.E.C v. Am. Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 610-12, 615 (1965); see also
COwANs, supra note 42, § 905.
65. COWANS, supra note 42,

66. Id. § 907.

§ 905.
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permission was not required to enter into a contract for sale of the
business.67 Under Chapter XI, where the creditors did not have faith or
confidence in the DIP, the proper action was to seek the appointment of a
receiver.68 A Chapter XI receiver was also appointed where there was no
successful rehabilitation of the debtor.6 9 Under Chapter XI, a receiver was
not able to object to creditors' claims, but creditors were able to object to
the ill-asserted claims of other creditors.7" Confirmation of a plan under
Chapter XI served to vest title and possession back from the DIP to the
debtor, although usually these were one in the same party.7 Thus, the
debtor had control of its "assets free of all controls of the court and
creditors except as provided in the plan. 72 In the 1970s, Chapter XI rules73
of the automatic stay,
were implemented including an early version
74
XI.
Chapter
of
which helped the effectiveness
Under Chapter XI, the DIP, the receiver, or the trustee had a duty to file
a statement of the financial condition of the estate within one month of the
petition. 75 This was not nearly the same level of burden as the financial
disclosure required under the Chapter X requirements,76 or the disclosure
statements required under a modem Chapter 11,77 and thus Chapter XI was
preferred to Chapter X. Generally, all that was necessary was to file was
~ under the Code, it was
a customary profit and lossii statement. 78 Unlike
possible at least in New York
for a small corporation to represent itself as
79
a debtor under Chapter XI.
The Act was very similar to the current § 36380 in that it allowed a
court to authorize the DIP, the receiver, or the trustee upon notice and as
the court prescribed and upon cause shown to sell or lease any property of
the debtor upon terms or as approved by the court.8 ' It was possible to
make a sale on no notice or short notice with sufficient cause.82 Normally
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
See Chandler Act, ch. II, § 2, 52 Stat. 840, 842 (1938); CowANS, supra note 42, § 907.
COWANS, supra note 42, § 907.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cf 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
COwANs, supra note 42, § 910.
See, e.g., Chandler Act, ch. V, § 43, 52 Stat. 840, 860 (1938).
See id.ch. X, art. VII, 52 Stat. 840, 888-90.
See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 521, 1106-1107 (2000); cf.11 U.S.C.A. § 1116 (West 2007).
See Chandler Act, ch. X, art. IV, § 130, 52 Stat. 840, 886 (1938).
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 363 (2000).
Chandler Act, ch. XI, art. III, § 313(2), 52 Stat. 840, 907 (1938).
See id § 315.
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under Chapter XI, it was not possible for a sale of all the assets of the
debtor unless there was an emergency that would warrant authority for the
total sale.83 Rarely did a court find such emergency authority, and it was
generally held that a sale of all of the assets under Chapter XI must be
questioned so that a court would review such a sale with some scrutiny.84
This was because Chapter XI did not allow for secured creditors' interest
to be affected." Under Chapter XI, court permission was necessary for the
DIP to redeem property from a lien or sale where it appeared desirable for
the continuing operation of the business.86
Under Chapter XI, there were no sub-priorities; all administrative
expenses where paid at the same priority rate.87 Under Chapter 11, there
were two main types of plans of arrangement: plans that obtained
additional time to pay obligations, an extension plan, or "settlement of the
obligations by the payment of less than is owed[,]" a composition plan.88
A court would confirm a plan under Chapter XI after all creditors affected
by the plan accepted its arrangements in writing, the debtor made a
deposit, and the court found the arrangement was in good faith.89
VI. CHAPTER XII

Chapter XII was only available to non-corporate debtors9° and thus was
not normally the envy of the larger corporations. However, a large single
asset structure such as an apartment building or high-rise could be titled
to an individual who could hold the asset in trust and seek the benefits of
Chapter XH. 9 ' As can be imagined, such a practice contained numerous
pitfalls. Chapter XH required that the creditors hold secured interest in a
debtor's real property;92 the essence of a Chapter XII was the
modifications of secured claims on real property or chattels real.93

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See In re Pure Penn Petroleum Co., 188 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir. 1951).
Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2000).
See generally Chandler Act, ch. XI, 52 Stat. 840, 905, 910 (1938).
COWANS, supra note 42, § 921.
Id. § 926.
Id. § 928.
Chandler Act, ch. XI, art. IX, §§ 361-362, 52 Stat. 840, 911 (1938).
CowANs, supra note 42, §§ 904, 1051.
Id. § 1051.
Chandler Act ch. XII, art. II, § 406, 52 Stat. 840, 916 (1938).
CowANs, supra note 42, § 904.
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Chapter XII became used considerably during the 1970s because of
"the disasters that befell many real estate limited partnerships." 94 Chapter
XII had provisions that were both variations of both Chapters X and XI,
and it might be considered as half-way between the two.95 Under Chapter
XII, it was possible to confirm a plan which was rejected by some secured
creditors. 96 Chapter XII encompassed both general and limited
partnerships.97 To seek protection under Chapter XII, it was necessary to
have a legal or equitable ownership of real property or chattel as security
for a debt.98 Corporations at times sought to take advantage of Chapter
XII; however, where a corporation transferred a property to a trustee to
take advantage of Chapter XII, the courts held the transaction improper. 99
Under Chapters XII and X, secured creditors could be adversely affected;
however, there were limits to the amount a secured creditors' interest
could be altered.100
A Chapter XII plan of arrangement was generally similar to Chapter XI
in that the effort was to gain additional time to pay an extension or to pay
a percentage of the total debt, or under Chapter XII, creditors were allowed
to create a plan for confirmation.10 ' Under Chapter XII, not all creditors
were required to file a claim to share in the distribution. 2 The operation
of Chapter XI is confined to unsecured debts although actions on secured
claims can be temporarily stayed.0 3 Chapters XII and XIII provide
procedures for permanently affecting creditors with both secured and
unsecured claims against individuals."°
"By the 1960s and early 1970s, the use of Chapter XI to reorganize
publicly held firms had become increasingly routine."'0 5 This allowed a6
growing class of corporate managers to retain their positions.1
94. Id. § 1051.
95. Id.
96. Chandler Act, ch. XII, art. IX, §§ 468, 472, 52 Stat. 840, 923 (1938).
97. COWANS, supranote 42, § 1052.
98. Chandler Act, ch. XII, art. II, § 406, 52 Stat. 840, 916 (1938); see COWANS, supra note
42, § 1052.
99. CowANS, supra note 42, § 1052 (citing In re Hook, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. 573 (Conn.
1974)).
100. Id. § 1055.
101. Chandler Act, ch. XII, art IX, § 466, 52 Stat. 840, 922-23 (1938).
102. See Chandler Act, ch. XII, art. VII, § 454, 52 Stat. 840, 920 (1938).
103. Id. ch. XI, art. II-II, §§ 307, 314, 52 Stat. 840, 906-07.
104. CompareChandler Act, ch. XII, art. VIII, § 461,52 Stat. 840,921-22, with ChandlerAct,
ch. XIII, art. VIII, § 646, 52 Stat. 840, 934.
105. See Skeel, supra note 23, at 1374-75.
106. Id. at 1375 (stating "managers of a troubled firm and their lawyers had strong incentives
to try for Chapter XI, since this chapter would enable both to retain their positions").
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Additionally, lower courts had an incentive to choose a Chapter XI
reorganization rather than a Chapter X proceeding, which required a
sharing of authority with the SEC and delayed the process." 7 As the
problems with the Bankruptcy Act became more pressingly clear,
Congress authorized commissions to study the program and develop
solutions to the growing problems. 18
These problems were certainly symptomatic of the degree to which the
remedies available in Chapters X, XI, and XII had become merged
together by creative lawyering and the willingness of courts to accept and
embody them in rulings. It was also a clear signal of changing times and
the move away from strict court-control of the reorganization process to
reflect the desire of the participants, debtor, and creditor groups to exert
control over the process. Because the participants in the process suffer the
ultimate economic benefits and consequences, this seemed only logical.
VII. ENTER THE CODE

The 1978 implementation of the Code was an attempt by Congress to
expand the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts and overhaul the system
in an effort to streamline the reorganization process.'0 9 The Code changes
were driven by the need for a more efficient reorganization scheme."0 The
massive overhaul has been characterized by some as an effort to balance
the sometimes competing interests of encouraging a market based upon
economic efficiency and insuring equity, fairness, and justice."' The Code
was an attempt to sculpt a bankruptcy system that was market driven and
gave significantly greater control to creditors." 2 Under the new Code,
creditors were more involved in the reorganization process, the U.S.
Trustee was present to ensure the integrity of the process, and the Code
107. Id.
108. See Maijorie L. Girth, A Response to the New Economicsof the AmericanFamily, 12 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 59, 60 (2004).
109. See Skeel, supra note 23, at 1377; see also Ralph Brubaker, Symposium, One Hundred
Years of Federal Bankruptcy Law and Still Clinging to an In Rem Model of Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction, 15 BANK. DEV. J. 261, 270 (1999) (detailing the change in jurisdiction of the
Bankruptcy courts over time).
110. See Skeel, supra note 23, at 1377.
111. Todd J. Zywicki, Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in
Englandand the UnitedStates, Bruce G. Carruthers& Terence C. Halliday, 16 BANKR. DEV. J.
361, 368-69 (2000) (book review).
112. See George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19 (2005)

(describing in unflattering terms both the aims guiding implementation of the Code as well as the
numerous, and sometimes unforeseen, market forces that affect the reorganization process).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 19

allowed a more efficient voting process.I13 As aforementioned, the courts
were legally removed from the administrative process and became more
focused on dispute resolution.
The Code streamlined the business reorganization process into an
ostensibly single method of reorganization, and the entire process is now
contained within the current Chapter 11.14
VIII. METAMORPHOSIS

The current Chapter 11 of the Code was designed to promote
reorganization and to give creditors a much greater say in the process. It
was designed with the goal of promoting the bargaining process with
checks and balances among the constituent groups.
For example, on the debtor's side, the automatic stay, the exclusivity,
and the prospect of confirmation by cramdown are significant weapons.
On the creditors' side, the termination of exclusivity, the prospect of
competing plans, the right to vote by impaired class, the absolute priority
rule, the prospect of conversion to Chapter 11, and ultimately liquidation
are among other things which provide significant leverage.
The notion has been that the confirmation process would occur through
the filing of a plan and disclosure statement, approval of the disclosure
statement, dissemination of adequate information to creditors, balloting by
impaired class, and approval of some version of the plan through a
confirmation hearing. In addition to tabulating ballots by class, the right
to object to confirmation would be additional protection for creditors as
well as the prospect to the debtor of losing its equity in a non-consensual
plan confirmed by cramdown.
These rules worked well to the extent that the nature of the cases
populating the system were driven by what has been referred to as
financial distress, which could be adjusted in a market context, while a
debtor enjoyed the breathing room provided by the automatic stay. The
provisions of the Code were designed to allow a DIP to continue to

113. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § § 1102-1103 (describing the constituency and powers of a creditors'
committee); see also In re Intercat, Inc., 247 B.R. 911,920-21 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000) (noting that
the "appointment of a trustee is a power which is critical for the court to exercise in order to
preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy process and to insure that the interest of creditors are
served"); 11 U.S.C. 1126 (describing acceptance of a plan).
114. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1129 (2000). Note the authors have spent considerably less time
writing the history of the Code compared to the Act. While practitioners have lived with the Code
for the past twenty-eight years, there are increasingly fewer practitioners who have practiced under
the Act.
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operate, hopefully solve its financial issues, and formulate and confirm a
plan that would allow for a payment stream to creditors through the
aforementioned "hypothetical" sale of the assets and conversion to claims
against a reorganized debtor.
The bargaining process would occur while the debtor maintained
exclusivity with the understanding that the termination of exclusivity could
bring with it a competing plan, change in equity ownership, conversion to
Chapter 7, and resulting liquidation. Still, this was premised on the
assumption that the debtor's financial distress was curable, either through
an infusion of capital, changes in the business model, increased cash flow
created by the "stretch," or reduction of existing debt to be paid by a
reorganized debtor over time. A debtor in true economic distress, as it had
been defined, cannot normally be reorganized, and for a business truly
unable to solve its economic woes, the concept of reorganization will
normally fail, resulting in some form of liquidation.
It is true that most debtors will not be able to effectively organize, and
the success ratio of Chapter 11 cases, although not easily quantifiable, is
normally historically deemed to be low. Indeed, many Chapter 11 cases
are not even filed with a belief that they can be reorganized. Instead, they
are a strategic way to delay creditors to achieve negotiating leverage. Over
the course of time, the notion that a Chapter 11 case must be a true
reorganization or result in a piecemeal liquidation of the debtor's business
in a Chapter 7 case has eroded. The provisions of Chapter 11 have been
adapted by creative lawyering and judicial willingness to consider
flexibility over time to meet the evolving needs of the marketplace-just
as they did under the Act which lead to the implementation of the Code.
The occurrence of a paradigm "reorganization" in which a confirmed plan
of reorganization results in a debtor emerging from the ashes of its
prepetition tribulations in phoenix-like fashion has more or less become
the exception, rather than the rule.

IX. THE CHAPTER 11 AUCTION

BLOCK

A. Using Bankruptcy Protection to Effect a Sale of Substantially All of
the Debtor s Assets
It is often the case that a petition under Chapter 11 is filed with no
intention of "reorganizing," and the use of Chapter 11 to maximize value
with the goal of effectuating an efficient and orderly sale process has
existed from the inception of the Code. The Code's various mechanisms
for adjusting debt and selling assets "free and clear," along with the
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comfort and finality that the blessing of a court provides, render
bankruptcy an attractive medium for the sale and acquisition of assets.
Financially troubled companies make attractive acquisition targets,
especially if the reasons for the company's financial troubles lie in an
excessively burdensome debt structure, rather than a flawed premise or
business model. The interested purchasers of such companies hope to
acquire the target's assets and successful operations without the
assumption of its large encumbering debts. Frequently, stock acquisitions
and statutory mergers will not achieve this goal because the crushing debt
and liabilities held by the pre-acquisition target company often follow the
purchaser along with the desirable assets. Accordingly, a financially
troubled company must preserve its going concern value while
significantly reducing and restructuring its debts to render the company an
attractive acquisition.
This is frequently achieved utilizing reorganization pursuant to Chapter
11 of the Code, which provides an opportunity for a debtor to reorganize
its business and financial affairs under the supervision and regulation of
a bankruptcy court. Chapter 11 embodies a policy that it is generally
preferable to liquidation because it enables a debtor to continue to operate
and to reorganize its business. The ability for a debtor to maintain control
of the business as a DIP" 5 and to continue operations often enables the
debtor to preserve a significantly positive difference between the6 going
concern value of the business and the firesale liquidation value."1
The ability to restructure and to drastically reduce the debts and
liabilities of a target company before it sells its assets, the ability to
preserve the going concern value of the target company, and the protection
of a court order approving the sale make the Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings an attractive forum for the sale of financially troubled
companies.

115.
[T]he Code contains a presumption that the debtor's business will continue to
operate and that the debtor will remain in possession after entry of an order for
relief, unless it can be established that cause exists for the appointment of a
trustee. This assures the debtor considerable control over operations ... (and] plan
negotiations.
COLLIERON BANKRuPTCY § 1100.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed., Matthew
Bender & Co. 2003). Unless an independent trustee is appointed, the DIP serves as, and has the
powers and responsibilities of the trustee in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2007).
116. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 115, § 1100.01. This is an interest near and dear
to the hearts of creditors who will rarely be paid in full on their claims and to the company's
principals who in many cases have personally guaranteed such claims.

THE LOST ART OF CHAPTER]] REORGANIZATION

The Chapter 11 process provides the acquirer with the
imprimatur of a court order determining that the particular sale has
been made in good faith, is not challengeable and is often free and
clear of liens, security interests and most liabilities. By ignoring or
penetrating the shroud of stigma and uncertainty that looms
ominously over a bankruptcy process, astute acquirers are
successfully expanding their businesses and investments by bidding
for and purchasing the businesses or assets of distressed debtors in
a manner that offers protection to all parties in interest and avoids
future litigation.
[U]se of the Chapter 11 process is frequently sought by all
parties, as it often has the effect of sanitizing the purchase and
affording all the parties protection against hindsight re-evaluations
as to the fairness of the transaction.' 7
The storybook Chapter 11 process is to effectuate a stand-alone
reorganization, in which the debtor can emerge as a solvent going concern.
However, in many cases, a stand-alone reorganization is not a feasible and
realistic goal, and a sale of the company as a going concern may be the
best method to generate the capital needed to fund the company's
reorganization and future survival. Additionally, a downturn in economic
conditions and the increased costs of securing rescue financing for
troubled companies cause many Chapter 11 debtors to promptly attempt
to sell their operations and assets to prevent further erosion in value."'
Frequently, the going concern value of a debtor company and its assets far
exceed the value of the same assets if the company were to be broken up

117. Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Chapter 11: An Acquisition Opportunityfor
Financialand StrategicBuyers, 18 BANKR. STRATEGIST 1 (July 2001).
118. Miller & Waisman, supra note 117.
With more frequency than over the past decade, distressed companies are finding
themselves compelled to sell their businesses or major assets in an effort to realize
going-concern values for the benefit of their creditors and, hopefully,
stockholders. In that scenario, a larger number of distressed companies have found
it necessary to resort to the provisions ofChapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
to consummate a sale.
Id.; Miller and Waisman observe this pattern in the context of the bursting technology bubble, but
such a pattern is even more relevant in the context of the current downturn in the real estate market
and related industries.
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and liquidated. For these reasons, creditor constituencies and particularly
secured creditors often strongly advocate a prompt sale of the company as
a going concern so that they can receive the maximum value from the
assets of the debtor.
B. Sale of SubstantiallyAll of the Debtor'sAssets
The provisions of the Code provide two primary ways to acquire the
assets of a Chapter 11 debtor. A DIP may sell its assets under §
363(b)(1)"'9 of the Bankruptcy Code, or a sale may be effectuated under
a plan of reorganization pursuant to § 1123 of the Code.12' Depending on
the objectives of the parties, each procedure offers its own benefits and
limitations.
A sale of a substantial portion of a company's assets under § 363(b)(1)
would not be viewed as "in the ordinary course of business" and is thus
completed only with the approval of a bankruptcy court after notice to
creditors and interested parties.12' This process allows the court to evaluate
the best interests of the debtor's estate and the parties in interest and
typically results in competitive bidding in an
attempt to yield the
2
maximum value for the estate and its creditors.
A prime objective of a Chapter 11 case is to maximize the value
of the debtor's estate. In the context of a § 363(b) sale, the
bankruptcy court is sensitive to the need to protect the interests of
the debtor's estate, including its creditors, equity interest holders

119. "The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary
course of business, property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2000).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2000).
121.
Pursuant to § 363(b), the business or assets of a debtor may be sold at any time
after the commencement of a Chapter 11 case and independently of a Chapter 11
plan, with substantial protections for the purchaser. Section 363(b) provides that
after notice and a hearing, a debtor may sell property of the estate, though outside
the ordinary course of business. This statutory provision has been construed by the
bankruptcy court to enable the sale of all or substantially all a debtor's assets and
operations without the requirement ofthe confirmation of a plan ofreorganization.
Miller & Waisman, supra note 117.
122. The Code contemplates that the debtor will appropriately advertise and that offers for the
assets and operations will be entertained. See id. Additionally, a § 363(b) sale may implicate the
sale marketing obligations and requirements found under state law. See generally,e.g., Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
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and other parties in interest. Consequently, the objective of any sale
pursuant to § 363(b) is to get the best offer for the debtor's estate.
To achieve that most effectively, all proposed sales under §
363(b) require court approval, a noticed and advertised hearing and
are subject to higher or better offers for the property to be sold.'23
The second method of purchasing a debtor company in Chapter 11 is
to do so through a plan of reorganization, 124 which may provide for a sale
of the debtor company and its assets pursuant to § 1123(a)(5) of the
Code.' 25 The purchase of a debtor via a plan of reorganization often
provides the buyer with more opportunity for input and control over the
terms of the sale. Sales that occur via a confirmed plan not only allow the
buyer to negotiate the terms of the acquisition, but also allow the buyer to
concurrently assist in shaping the reorganization of the debt structure of
the company that it is about to acquire. Because of the democratic nature
of the process, confirming a plan of reorganization often does not require
the same court scrutiny in evaluating what is in the best interest of the
estate, and the sale is not required to consist of an open auction process.
As long as the Code's requirements on plan confirmation procedures and
plan contents are met, the terms of the plan can be extremely creative and
can vary significantly from case to case.
X. To PLAN OR NOT TO PLAN
The procedures authorized by § 363(b)(1) are common and effective
means to sell the assets of the debtor; however, the sub-section offers very
little opportunity for buyers to exert control over the process. A sale under
§ 363(b)(1) involves an open bidding process, and the bids are evaluated
to determine which offer would yield the most benefit for the bankruptcy
estate. 26 The control that a bidder exerts in this process lies merely in the

123. Miller & Waisman, supra note 117.
124. Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization is a regulated process of negotiation
between the debtor, the creditors, and other parties at interest. The confirmed plan will contain the
details of who will be paid, how much they will be paid, and from where the money to pay will be
generated. The Code contains minimum requirements for the contents of a plan. However, if the
plan meets the requirements of the Code, there are few limits on the creativity that a party can use
in drafting the terms of a plan of reorganization.
125. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) (2000).
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2000).
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control over the details of the offer and the ability to persuade a court that
the offer is in the best interests of the estate.
A court evaluates a trustee or DIP's decision to sell its assets under a
test similar to the business judgment rule, thus giving a great deal of
deference to the trustee's decision.'27 However, while this test grants
deference to the decisions of the trustee, "when a pre-confirmation §
363(b) sale is of all, or substantially all, of the Debtor's property, and is
proposed during the beginning stages of the case, the sale transaction
should be 'closely scrutinized, and the proponent bears a heightened
burden of proving the elements necessary for authorization."" 28
A sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a Chapter 11 debtor
outside of a confirmed plan of reorganization must be made for a sound
business purpose129 ; however, many courts have determined that a sale of
all or substantially all of the debtor's assets under § 363 may undermine
the Chapter 11 process by circumventing the procedures and protections
(i.e., disclosure, voting, and substantive plan content requirements) of the
plan confirmation process. 3 ' A party may be able to effectively stop a §

127.
This Court follows the "sound business purpose" test when examining § 363(b)
sales. The test consists of four elements. A trustee or debtor-in-possession must
prove that: (1) a sound business reason or emergency justifies a pre-confirmation
sale; (2) adequate and reasonable notice of the sale was provided to interested
parties; (3) the sale has been proposed in good faith; and (4) the purchase price is
fair and reasonable. The first requirement is a sound business reason justifying the
pre-confirmation sales. This element is similar to many states "business judgment
rule," where great deference is given to a business in determining its own best
interests.
In re W.A. Mallory Co., 214 B.R. 834, 836 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) (citations omitted).
128. In re Med. Software Solutions, 286 B.R. 431,445 (Bankr. D. Utah 2002) (quoting In re
Channel One Commc'ns, Inc., 117 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990)).
129.
The plain meaning of the statute would imply that the bankruptcy court has
unfettered discretion in approving sales outside of an approved plan of
reorganization because the statute does not specifically set forth that limitation.
The Court, however, agrees with the majority of bankruptcy courts in accepting
the boundaries set by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that requires "a judge
determining a § 363(b) application [to] find from the evidence presented before
him at the hearing a good business reason to grant such an application" to sell
substantially all of a debtor's assets outside the confines of a confirmed plan.
Id. at 440 (citing In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1063 (2d Cir. 1983)).
130. See, e.g., In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983).
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363 sale, by objecting to the sale on the grounds that the sale constitutes
an impermissible Sub Rosa plan."'
On the flip side, because of the procedures and protections in place to
prevent abuses of the bankruptcy process and to protect the various
parties' interests, plan confirmation can be a timely and expensive process.
Included in the substantive and procedural hurdles to the sale of the debtor
via a plan of reorganization are the drafting of a plan that will meet the
requirements of the Code and which will be favorable to those parties who
must vote to accept the plan, obtaining the court's approval of a disclosure
statement, 32 responding to the objections of opposing parties, soliciting
approval of the plan, and completing the terms set forth in the plan. An
interested buyer must be aware of the burdens to confirm a plan and to
include the time and expense in the overall cost of acquiring the target
company.
Parties that wish to purchase a Chapter 11 debtor have far more ways
to influence the acquisition process under the plan confirmation process
than under § 363. If a buyer is a party in interest, 33 then the interested
buyer may itself propose a plan of reorganization. 13 The ability to draft a
plan of reorganization gives the buyer direct control over the terms of the
proposed plan. Additionally, parties with standing may object to the terms
of a plan proposed by another party on the grounds that it does not meet
the requirements imposed by the Code. 35 Moreover, the buyer may also
be eligible to vote to accept or reject competing plans of reorganization
and may be able to increase his voting power by purchasing additional
claims against the estate.
As previously noted, the Code contains the minimum requirements for
the contents of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization; 36 however, the fact
that a plan meets the substantive statutory requirements does not ensure

131. See In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986).
132. The Code requires that a disclosure statement, which contains information regarding the
plan of reorganization, must be approved before solicitation for acceptance of a plan of
reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b). The approval of a disclosure statement may be a timely and
costly process and can be an area of significant dispute.
133. A party in interest is a term that is not directly defined by the Code; however, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1109 includes as possible parties in interest the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an
equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee.
11 U.S.C. § 1109 (b) (2000 & Supp. 1 2004).
134. "Any party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity
security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may file
aplan ....
11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2000).
135. "A party in interest may object to confirmation of a plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1128(b) (2000).
136. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2000).
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that the plan will be confirmed. Confirmation of a plan generally requires
the various classes'37 of creditors and other interest holders to accept the
plan. 38
' Thus, the ability to write and propose a plan may give an interested
buyer control over the drafting of the terms of the plan, but drafting a plan
that will be confirmed requires the drafter to consider the interests and
demands of the various parties who will vote on whether to accept the plan
in addition to the statutory requirements of the Code.
Depending on the nature of their claims, interested buyers may be
among those parties who will have the opportunity to vote for or against
the confirmation of the plan.'39 Both the amount and number of claims that
the party holds against the debtor's estate determine the weight of a party's
vote on the confirmation of a plan. 40 Thus, if a creditor holds large enough
portions of the claims against the debtor's estate, then the creditor could
have a large influence on the acceptance or rejection of a proposed plan.
Regardless of which of the above procedures is ultimately used, the
liquidation of substantially all of the debtor's assets through a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding has grown to be a widely utilized and accepted
practice.
XI. LIQUIDATING PLANS OF REORGANIZATION?

A. Chapter 7 Light-Same Great Taste with Fewer Calories
As noted above, it is permissible' 4 ' and frequently the case'42 that a plan
of reorganization provides for the sale of substantially all of the debtor's
assets and the distribution of the proceeds amongst creditors. However,
even where a determination has been made to liquidate rather than
reorganize, a debtor's most valuable assets are often not easily saleable
(such as valuable litigation claims held by the debtor which must be
prosecuted to realize cash for creditors), and maximum liquidation value
may be realized and maximized only by continued control and
administration of such assets by interested parties.

137. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2000) (requiring that classes consist of substantially
similar claims).
138. See 11 U.S.C. 1126(c) (2000).
139. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (2000).

140. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2000).
141. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (2000).
142. For example, this is true especially with respect to debtors whose assets are for the most
part tied up in a large single asset, such as single asset real estate cases.
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This set of circumstances has resulted in what can perhaps be described
as the antithesis ofthe paradigm "reorganization"-the growing popularity
of liquidating plans of reorganization and in particular the use of
liquidating trusts to liquidate assets for the benefit of creditor beneficiaries.
In such cases, the terms of the confirmed plan, rather than the Code,
determine the manner in which assets are liquidated and how such assets
are utilized to pay creditors. Often, the estate's assets are transferred into
a trust created by the terms of the confirmed plan, and, upon the effective
date of the plan, the creditors of the estate trade their creditor status for a
beneficiary interest in the trust res. These liquidating trusts are, in almost
all cases, administered by a liquidating trustee, and the terms of the trust
often mirror the procedures and priorities set forth in the Code. In fact, in
many cases, such liquidating trusts grant the liquidating trustee the powers
and duties of a Chapter 7 trustee to administer assets in much the same
way as if the case were to proceed under Chapter 7. Additionally, despite
many jurisdictional quandaries, these liquidating trusts often continue to
be administered under the supervision of a bankruptcy court in much the
same way as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.
This widespread phenomenon grew in popularity following the mass
tort and asbestos bankruptcies of the 1980s. Such bankruptcy proceedings
were saddled with the task of administering vast amounts of assets to
satisfy an even greater and usually insurmountable amount of debt, much
of which consisted of unliquidated claims, contingent tort claims, or
both.'4 3 By funding a trust with the debtor's assets and channeling
litigation claims to look to the trust for payment, the liquidating trust (also
sometimes called a litigation trust) provided procedures and mechanisms
for the orderly administration of claims and assets. The trust provided such
order without the excessive burden on the docket and resources of the
bankruptcy court that would be caused by leaving the case in a bankruptcy
proceeding for decades. These post-confirmation trusts often provide for
reduction in notice and approval requirements,'" especially with respect,

143. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618,621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating
"[o]ne of the most innovative and unique features of the Manville Plan of Reorganization
(the'Plan') is the establishment of two Trusts out of which all asbestos-related claims will be
paid.").
144. See, e.g., In re Antonelli, 148 B.R. 443,444,447 (D. Md. 1992); aff'd, 4 F.3d 984 (4th
Cir. 1993); State of Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 780 (4th Cir.
1997) (plan of reorganization required the Antonellis to transfer substantially all of their property
interests to a liquidating trust for liquidation "as rapidly as market conditions allow." "By using a
trust, the Antonellis and the creditors hoped to avoid the expense and delay of having the
bankruptcy court separately approve each of more than 150 property sales.").
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to administrative matters,'45 and additionally, may provide for alternative
methods for liquidation of claims including arbitration and estimation
procedures.
The initial manifestations of these post-confirmation trusts, even
outside of the context of mass tort liability, were actually utilized as tools
of reorganization to allow the debtor to continue its existence severed from
its insurmountable debt, while simultaneously providing for the
liquidation, administration, and hopefully satisfaction ofthe claims against
the debtor.46 However, over time these tools have evolved (or devolved)
into mechanisms often used for orderly liquidation of a debtor's assets."'
The growing popularity of this type of approach was recently noted by
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which stated,
While we typically think of Chapter 11 as the "reorganization"
section of the Bankruptcy Code (as opposed to Chapter 7, the
"liquidation" section), it is not uncommon for debtors to use the
Chapter 11 process to liquidate. This is because Chapter 11
provides more flexibility and control in determining how to go
about selling off the various aspects of the debtor's business and
distributing the proceeds. A typical mechanism for effecting a
Chapter 11 liquidation is the creation of a "liquidating trust"--a
state-law trust managed by a group of creditors that succeeds to the
debtor's assets and administers the liquidation and distribution
process. 48
'
The use of a "liquidating plan" is often coupled with the
aforementioned procedures for the sale of a debtor's assets under 11
U.S.C. §363. This is particularly common in cases in which substantially

145. This includes the approval and payment of administrative and professional fees, which
are often paid without court involvement upon simply providing notice to an oversight committee
or similar procedures.
146. See, e.g., In re Johns-ManvilleCorp., 68 B.R. at 622; see also Holywell Corp. v. United
States, 85 B.R. 898 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); Hollywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47, 51 (1992)
(although debtor entities continued to exist, liquidating trust vested with all property of the estate).
147. See, e.g., In re Lisanti Foods, No. 05-3912, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18445 (3d Cir. June
28, 2007); Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1335 (3d Cir. 2007); Trs. of the Trism
Liquidating Trust v. IRS (In re Trism, Inc.), 126 Fed. Appx. 339 (8th Cir. 2005); Feltman v.
Warmus (In re Am. Way Serv. Corp.), 229 B.R. 496, 502 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) (referring to the
joint plan of liquidation creating the liquidating trusts).
148. In re Insilco Techs., Inc., 480 F.3d 212, 214 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007).

THE LOST ART OF CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION

all of the debtor's saleable assets 149 are administered by way of a § 363
sale leaving the estate with proceeds of the sale along with unliquidated
litigation claims,15° including avoidance actions. In such scenarios, a
liquidating trust is funded with some or all of the § 363 sale proceeds, and
is vested with the estate's litigation claims,' 5' which are then prosecuted,
and hopefully liquidated to cash, by the liquidating trustee for the benefit
of the creditors who, after confirmation, become the beneficiaries of the
newly created trust.152 Additionally, the liquidating trustee is often
and resolution of claims and
concurrently saddled with the administration
3
1
thereto.
related
the objections
An objective observer might notice that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate
seems to be an extremely well-tested, tried and true form of a liquidating
trust administered under the powers of a bankruptcy court by a courtappointed and experienced trustee. Why then are these liquidating Chapter
11 cases not simply converted to Chapter 7 for liquidation? At the most
fundamental level, the answer is control.
Creditors are often hesitant about trusting the destiny of their claims to
the perceived whims of a Chapter 7 trustee and the trustee's chosen
professionals, who are frequently perceived to look for the low hanging
fruit rather than the maximization of estate assets.'54 Liquidating trusts
created by the terms of a plan and drafted by the largest creditor
beneficiary or a creditors committee allow creditors to feel comfortable
that they are placing the hopes of satisfying their claims (often through the
litigation of claims formerly belonging to the debtor) in the hands of a
person of their choosing, frequently with counsel of their choosing, and

149. These assets often include real property, tangible personal property, accounts receivable,
intellectual property, and other assets easily converted to cash in the marketplace. See, e.g., ACC
Bondholder Group v. Adelphia Commc'ns. Corp. (In re Adelphia Commc'ns. Corp.), 361 B.R. 337,
342 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
150. These claims include claims against former directors and officers or professionals such
as attorneys and accountants. Id.
151. These are in many cases the most valuable assets to the estate, but the most difficult to
easily convert to cash. Id.
152. Id.; see also Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP (in re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 372 F.3d
154, 157 (3d Cir. 2004) (Trust beneficiaries traded their creditor status to attain rights to the Trust's
assets).
153. See, e.g., Trs. of the Trism Liquidating Trust v. IRS (In re Trism, Inc.), 126 Fed. Appx.
339 (8th Cir. 2005).
154. Notably, the authors of this Article view these perceptions to be just
that-perceptions-and believe that the competing interests and practical implications exist
whether a fiduciary is serving as a liquidating trustee, Chapter 7 trustee, plan administrator, or other
similar title. In fact, the professionals who serve in such variant roles are often the same individuals.
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under the terms, conditions, and distribution schemes that they deem
appropriate.
B. LiquidatingReorganizationwith EvaporatingJurisdiction
It is almost intuitive to bankruptcy practitioners that following the
confirmation of a plan of reorganization, the estate assets are vested in the
reorganized debtor, the estate ceases to exist, and the affairs of a
reorganized debtor continue to operate after emerging from Chapter 11
through a plan of reorganization are almost exclusively governed by the
terms of the plan of reorganization and the application of non-bankruptcy
law.'55 However, when the estate's assets are vested in a liquidating trust
or a similar non-debtor entity, rather than with a reorganized debtor, the
jurisdictional boundaries of the bankruptcy court are often
overlooked56-in no small part due to the confusion (or perhaps
intentional blissful ignorance) of attorneys and bankruptcy judges alike.
A liquidating trust is no different than a post-confirmation reorganized
debtor. It is an entity which inherits the assets of the bankruptcy estate,
which ceases to exist post-confirmation, and which is governed by the
terms of the plan of reorganization and applicable non-bankruptcy law.'57
However, because these liquidating trusts bear substantial similarities to
liquidation under Chapter 7, they are often administered by the bankruptcy
court in much the same manner as Chapter 7 proceedings.
This process is especially evident in cases where the plan of
reorganization which establishes the trust is drafted in such a way to leave
much of the procedures for administration of the trust to the imagination
and interpretation of a court. Such vagaries lead bankruptcy practitioners
and courts to utilize the procedures set forth in the Code and the Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure regardless of their applicability. For better or for
worse, a liquidating trust, like a reorganized debtor, is a creature of state
law and is administered with far less court oversight and control than a
Chapter 7 liquidation.
In fact, independence and flexibility in the liquidation process is in
most cases the precise incentive for utilizing a plan of liquidation rather
than simply converting a case to Chapter 7. A plan of reorganization under
Chapter 11 determines the manner in which the property of the estate will
be divided amongst creditors-whether that division and distribution is

155. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (2000).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1334.
157. See, e.g., Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP (Inre Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 372 F.3d 154,
165 (3d Cir. 2004).
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through cash payment, assignment of property, or administration through
a trust. By consummation of a confirmed plan, the debtor's relationship
with its creditors is supplanted by the terms of the plan setting forth the
manner in which the bankruptcy estate created under § 541 is to be
distributed. The bankruptcy estate is no more, and the creditors' claims
against that estate are administered as provided for by the plan.
In light of the foregoing, the above described charade of administering
a liquidating trust as a "Chapter 7 light" presents serious problems of
subject matter jurisdiction and clogs the bankruptcy courts' dockets with
cases that have already emerged from the bankruptcy system and with
respect to which there is no bankruptcy estate to be administered.
C. JurisdictionalQuandariesandBoundaries
As a threshold matter, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 is the basis for the district
court's "bankruptcy jurisdiction." Section 1334(b) provides in relevant
part that "the district courts shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or
." '
This provision establishes the
related to cases under title
jurisdiction of the district courts over three types of proceedings: those that
arise under title 1 , those that arise in cases under title 11, and those
related to cases under title 11.160
The test to determine whether a claim is "related to" a case under title
11 was articulated by the Third Circuit in Pacor,Inc. v. Higgins,161 which
stated, "The usual articulation of the test for determining whether a civil
proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome of that
proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being
administeredin bankruptcy."'62
This test has been adopted by the vast majority of circuit courts and
was specifically adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in the Lemco Gypsum

158. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2000).
159. "Arising under" cases are matters invoking a substantive right created by the Bankruptcy
Code, for example, an action to avoid a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547 or fraudulent
transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 548. See Wood v. Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987). The "arising
in" category involves administrative matters or matters that could only arise in bankruptcy-for
example, the filing of a proof of claim or an objection to the discharge of a particular debt. See
Warren v. Calania Corp., 178 B.R. 279, 281 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
160. See In re Toledo, 170 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307 (1995)).
161. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984).
162. Id. at 994.
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bankruptcy proceedings. 163 In adopting this test, the Eleventh Circuit
expressly noted, however, that, "[t]he fact that property was once owned
by a bankrupt does not supply federal jurisdiction of all future disputes
concerning the property."'" This commentary is particularly applicable
with regards to the application of "related to" jurisdiction to postconfirmation proceedings and matters involving an entity vested with
property of the estate through a confirmed plan. Despite the apparent
breadth of the Pacortest, "related to" jurisdiction becomes very limited
following the confirmation of a plan of reorganization. In Binder v. Price
Waterhouse & Co., LLP, 165 the Third Circuit addressed the problematic
nature of applying its own Pacortest to post-confirmation matters:
After confirmation of a reorganization plan, retention of bankruptcy
jurisdiction may be problematic. This is so because, under
traditional Pacoranalysis, bankruptcy jurisdiction will not extend
to a dispute between non-debtors unless the dispute creates "the
logical possibility that the estate will be affected." At the most
literal level, it is impossible for the bankrupt debtor's estate to be
affected by a post-confirmation dispute because 166
the debtor's estate
ceases to exist once confirmation has occurred.
"Of course, a bankruptcy court does not lose all jurisdiction once a
[C]hapter 11 plan has been confirmed. Nevertheless, its role is limited to
matters involving the execution, implementation, or interpretation of the
plan's provisions, and to disputes requiring the application of bankruptcy
law."' 67 Accordingly, the scope of the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction
6
following confirmation is significantly limited. 1
The effect of the above jurisdictional limitations is particularly evident
with respect to those liquidating trusts which attempt to use the bankruptcy
court to resolve its post-confirmation disputes and liquidate its claims. For

163. Miller v. Kemira, Inc. (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 910 F.2d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 1990).
164. Id. at 789.
165. Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 372 F.3d 154, 165 (3d
Cir. 2004).
166. Id. at 164-65 (citations omitted).
167. Zahn Assocs., Inc. v. Leeds Bldg. Prods, Inc. (In re Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc.), 160 B.R.
689, 691 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993) (citations omitted).
168. See H & L Developers v. Arvida/JMB Partners (In re H & L Developers), 178 B.R. 71,
76 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that the court's jurisdiction begins to weaken once a plan is
confirmed); Eastland Partners Ltd. v. Brown (In re Eastland Partners Ltd.), 199 B.R. 917, 919-20
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) ("Following confirmation ofa [C]hapter I debtor's plan, a bankruptcy

court has a fairly narrow jurisdiction.").
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example, in Grimes v. Graue (In re Haws),'69 the bankruptcy court held
that it did not have post-confirmation jurisdiction over an action brought
by a trustee of a liquidating trust against a partner of the debtor for breach
of fiduciary duty.'70 The bankruptcy court noted that because the property
of the estate was vested in the reorganized debtor following confirmation
of a plan of reorganization, the proceeding must significantly affect
consummation of the plan to establish subject matter jurisdiction. 7 '
Because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate how any damages recovered
from the defendant were necessary to effectuate the terms of the plan, and
the bankruptcy court was not being asked to construe or interpret the
confirmed plan or to implement or effectuate the terms of the plan, it did
172
not have subject matterjurisdiction over the liquidating trustee's claims.
Even courts applying narrow standards to the exercise of "related to"
jurisdiction over post-confirmation matters find that jurisdiction exists to
"protect its [confirmation] decree, to prevent interference with the debtor's
73
plan of reorganization, and to otherwise aid in its execution."'
Additionally, under a far broader approach, the fact that the outcome of a
dispute will significantly affect a reorganized debtor's ability to repay
creditors under the terms of the plan may justify the exercise of postconfirmation jurisdiction. 174 However, this approach has been rejected by
many courts noting that the breadth of such an analysis could provide
subject matter jurisdiction ad infinitum. 75 Moreover, courts have
particularly noted in the case of liquidating trusts that there is no longer an
estate or creditors of the estate because creditors have traded their creditor
interest in exchange 76for status as beneficiaries of the trust established by
the confirmed plan.1

169. Grimes v. Graue (In re Haws), 158 B.R. 965 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
170. Id.at 971.
171. Id. at970-71.
172. Id.at 971; see also Rahl v. Bande, 316 B.R. 127, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
173. State ofMontanav. Goldin (In re Pegasus Gold Corp.), 296 B.R. 227,235 (D. Nev. 2003)
(citations omitted) (noting that jurisdiction existed to prevent conduct and events that obstructed
the means to fulfill the plan of reorganization).
174. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (In re Ionosphere
Clubs, Inc.), No. 89 B 10448, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1875, at *31-32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12,
1999).
175. Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 372 F.3d 154, 164 (3d
Cir. 2004) ("bankruptcy court jurisdiction 'must be confined within appropriate limits and does not
extend indefinitely, particularly after the confirmation of a plan and the closing of a case."' (citing
Donaldson v. Bernstein, 104 F.3d 547, 552 (3d Cir. 1997)).
176. See, e.g., In re Resorts Int'l, Inc., 372 F.3d at 165.
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The "close nexus" approach appears to be the better and most widely
accepted test to determine the bankruptcy court's post-confirmation
jurisdiction. "'Matters that affect the interpretation, implementation,
consummation, execution, or administration of the confirmed plan'7 7 will
typically have the requisite close nexus' to the bankruptcy case to support
'related to' jurisdiction," along with the jurisdiction over the "arising"
matters.'78 This test is in pari materia with the Code which specifically
anticipates court post-confirmation jurisdiction to implement and
consummate a confirmed plan.
Section 1142 of the Bankruptcy Code states in relevant part:
(b) The court may direct the debtor and any other necessary party
to execute or deliver or to join in the execution or delivery of any
instrument required to effect a transfer of property dealt with by a
confirmed plan, and to perform any other act, including the
satisfaction
of any lien, that is necessary for the consummation of
79
1
plan.
the
Those who wish to liquidate a debtor's assets must pick their poison,
and if they determine that they want to liquidate through a Chapter 11 plan
which vests the assets in a non-debtor entity for purposes of liquidation,
then the plan should be carefully and specifically drafted so as to provide
for the rules and procedures necessary to administer the post-confirmation
entity. Furthermore, they should be prepared for the likely scenario that
they will find themselves in a non-bankruptcy forum with respect to the
liquidation ofthe former bankruptcy estate's litigation claims and disputes
arising under the trust.
While the trend toward utilizing liquidating trusts and similar
mechanisms to distribute estate property amongst creditors remains a
viable option, to the extent that the average debtor's goal is a sale or an
orderly liquidation, serious thought should be given to whether non-

177. It is often the case that the terms of a confirmed plan and confirmation order expressly
retain jurisdiction for various purposes, and while it is recognized that parties cannot create
jurisdiction through the terms of a plan, when such retention language is within the bounds of §
1334 jurisdiction, it is relevant to a court's decision to exercise such jurisdiction. See, e.g., Almac's,
Inc. v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 202 B.R. 648, 656 (Dist. R.I. 1996); Gray v. Polar Molecular Corp.,
195 B.R. 548, 554-55 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996). While such provisions do not on their own create
jurisdiction, where jurisdiction otherwise exists, they will often be given effect. In re ResortsInt'l,
Inc., 372 F.3d at 167.
178. Rahl v. Bande, 316 B.R. 127, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting In re Resorts Int'l,Inc., 372
F.3d at 167).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 1142 (2000).

THE LOSTART OFCHAPTER II REORGANIZATION

bankruptcy liquidation' 8 ° would be a more productive and cost effective
means. This is especially true where the alternative is the creation of a
liquidating trust to ultimately be governed by non-bankruptcy law in any
event and only after a costly Chapter 11 plan confirmation process.
XII. THE IMPACT OF BAPCPA ON THE EVOLVING PROCESS
Against this backdrop along comes the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). Its provisions include
not only significant revisions to the process of consumer bankruptcy which
have been the focus of much publicity but also include selective but
important revisions to various aspects of business bankruptcy law which
cannot help but have an impact on the Chapter 11 reorganizations process.
It is not the purpose of this Article to bemoan the provisions of BAPCPA.
In fact, its business bankruptcy provisions have been soundly criticized on
many fronts with the blame being placed in various places including the
impact of lobbying efforts by various creditor interest groups, lack of
solicitation of appropriate input from the parties most involved in the
process, and even congressional overreaction to recent high profile cases
such as Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia, and others. 8 ' The question here is
the extent to which the business bankruptcy provisions of BAPCPA impact
the ability to utilize the provisions of Chapter 11 to accomplish a true
reorganization as it has been described above. Or, alternatively, whether
they encourage the continuing trend of utilization of the Chapter 11
process to accomplish a controlled form of liquidation.
Clearly, certain provisions of BAPCPA discourage true reorganization
or at least make it more difficult. These would certainly include provisions
which limit the automatic stay,' 82 limit exclusivity,' 83 and increase the
debtor's burdens regarding assumption and rejection of executory
contracts and unexpired leases."8 4 They would also include those
provisions which have the prospect of adding significant additional cost

180. Such non-bankruptcy liquidation includes an assignment for the benefit of creditors under
state law. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 727.101-116 (2007).
181. An excellent discussion of the significant business provisions of BAPCPA and their
potential problems in the reorganization process can be found in the article, Richard Levin & Alesia
Ranney-Marinelli, The CreepingRepeal of Chapter11: The SignificantBusiness Provisionsof the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 603

(2005).
182. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
183. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1121(d)(2) (West 2008).
184. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (2005).
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to the reorganization process. A primary example of this would be the
changes created by BAPCPA regarding reclamation rights, 85 adequate
87
assurance of payment regarding utility service, 86 increased tax burdens, 1
and a host of others.
One of the new provisions that will have a significant effect on many
reorganizing debtors, especially high volume purchasers and sellers such
as retailers and middleman wholesalers is the change to 11 U.S.C. §
503(b)(9). Under BAPCPA, a seller may seek an administrative expense
claim for goods delivered in the twenty days before the petition date. This
means that by the effective date of a plan the reorganizing debtor will have
to pay such a claim in cash.' 88 As demonstrated by In re Dana Corp., this
could seriously alter a debtor's bargaining position during the process of
a reorganization. 9
In Dana Corp., the debtors filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the
Code, and the court entered an order establishing the last date to file proofs
of claims for all prepetition claims. 90 Over six months after the bar date
had passed, a creditor filed a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9), seeking
$1,401,053 for goods it delivered to the debtors during the twenty-day
period immediately preceding the date they filed for bankruptcy, and it
asked the court for enlargement of time to file its claim because it had not
received notice of the bar date.' 9' The court found that the creditor was not
entitled to an enlargement of time under the movant's theory of excusable
neglect.' 92 However, this case demonstrates the drastic effects the modified
provisions 11 U.S.C. §503(b)(9) might have on a reorganizing debtor. Had
the movant (here Goodyear Tire and Rubber) timely filed, or the court
found excusable neglect, the debtor would have had nearly a million and
a half less dollars to use in the reorganization process because the claim
would have been paid on the effective date of the plan as an administrative
priority. 193 This sets up further litigation hurdles and evidentiary matters
(i.e., What date were goods actually delivered or as in Dana Corp., may
a latecomer sellerjump into the process with a large administrative claim?)
that will likely increase the transactional costs of the reorganization
185. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(9) (West 2008).
186. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 366(c) (West 2008).
187. See 11 U.S.C. § 346 (2000).
188. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(9) (West 2008).
189. In re Dana Corp., No. 06-10354,2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1934, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May
30, 2007).
190. Id. at *3, *5.
191. Id. at *2-4.
192. See id. at*16-19.
193. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(9) (West 2008).
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process. Under this statutory scheme, a high volume debtor seeking to
reorganize will need to carefully weight its cash on hand against potential
administrative claims for goods received in the twenty days before
bankruptcy to determine the feasibility of a plan. The costs of
reorganization are increased because more time and expense will be spent
determining the administrative status of goods delivered pre-petition and
greater cash will be needed on hand at the effective date of the plan.
A further change under BACPA limits the amount of time a court may
extend a debtor's time to accept or reject a non-residential lease to a
maximum of 210 days.' 94 Congress's intent in revising this section, was to
"'establish a firm, bright light deadline by which an unexpired lease of
nonresidential real property must be assumed or rejected."" 95 This creates
the very real probability of limiting the time of the overall negotiation
process for reorganization. If a debtor cannot come to terms with his
creditors within the 210-day window, the debtor will be forced to make a
potentially costly decision about his leases before the negotiation process
of reorganization has had time to come to fruition. In the meantime, an
early decision on assumption followed by a default could seriously
increase Chapter 11 administrative debt.
Of additional note is the change to the exclusivity period under which
a debtor may propose a plan of reorganization.' 96 A debtor has a more
limited time during which it has bargaining power to develop a plan of
reorganization before creditors can enter the process with the obvious
incentive to seek to benefit themselves at the expense of the debtor.'97
As noted by Judge Lynn in In re Gen. Electrodynamics Corp.:
Congress enacted provisions favoring special classes ofcreditors
to the exclusion of all other considerations. Thus, in amending, for
example, sections 365, 366 and 1121 of the Code, Congress has
presumably intentionally, made [C]hapter 11 much less suitable as
a remedy than it was before BAPCPA became effective. Companies
such a Kmart, Mirant Corp. and United Airlines, all of which have
194. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365 (d)(4)(B)(i) (West 2008).
195. In re Tubular Techs., LLC, 348 B.R. 699,708 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) (citingH.R.REP.No.
109-31(I), at 88 (2005)).
196. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1121(d) (West 2008).
197. See In re Mirant Corp., 348 B.R. 720, 723 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (noting that "[T]he
severe limitations [BAPCPA] imposes on the length of reorganization cases reinforce the court's
conclusion that much more delay in the rehabilitation (or other disposition) of[a debtor] should not
be tolerated."); see also In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 198, 204-05 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007)
(describing the rigidity of the time limitations on reorganization).
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survived through use of [C]hapter 11, very likely could not
restructure effectively under the Code since the passage of
BAPCPA.' 98
These extra burdens generally require that the debtor establish and
effectuate its reorganization plan in a shortened period of time. Instead of
looking to a long term solution to a business problem via a reorganized
debtor, these changes appear to encourage a more short term solution such
as sale of the assets or some form of liquidation as described above.
While the provisions ofBAPCPA create significant additional burdens,
it cannot truly be said at this point in time that they significantly impact
the decision and the ability to reorganize as opposed to liquidate. It still
seems appropriate that this decision is a reflection of trends which have
been in place for a significant period of time and which are driven by the
market place and the economy. Indeed, these provisions may reflect the
trend rather than advance it.
XIII. CONCLUSION

The statutory provisions and case law related to the current process of
reorganization available under Chapter 11 of the Code have and will
continue to provide an effective tool for reorganization of businesses
where in fact that reorganization is appropriate and desired. While the
increased burdens created by BAPCPA may have an effect on decisions
to utilize Chapter 11 and to pursue reorganization as opposed to
liquidation under Chapter 11, these probably impact smaller cases more
than the larger ones on a decisional basis.
More significantly, the trend which was implemented and refined preBAPCPA of utilizing the Chapter 11 process to accomplish a controlled
liquidation, embodied in the concept of the § 363 sale and the use of
liquidating trusts, will continue because that is what the marketplace
dictates and requires. That may be the result of creditor control over the
process as opposed to the desires of debtors, but it is and will continue to
be an economic reality.
Is that good or bad? That certainly depends on the perspective of the
party answering the question. Ultimately, if the insolvency process is
designed to provide a maximum return to creditors, than creditor control
that advances the current trend is justified. Conversely, if one desires the
return to the days when a true bargaining process occurred in the
198. In re Gen. Electrodynamics Corp., 368 B.R. 543, 549 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007).
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reorganization process with the goal of saving companies through
restructuring debt, it may not be justified.
The good news is that the framework still exists statutorily and under
decisional law for the reorganization process to occur as originally
contemplated where it is economically justified and desired. Where it is
not, the process also works to allow liquidation as an alternative.
While cries have been heard for the privatizing of the reorganization
process, we are unlikely to see that occur anytime in the near future. We
must, therefore, as practitioners, continue to work within the current
boundaries which are only capped by creative lawyering and a willingness
of courts to permit it. Maybe things haven't changed as much as we think.
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